Not without a head: deconstructing the myth of absence of leadership behind the demonstrations pro-impeachment in Brazil[1]

Não sem uma cabeça: desconstruindo o mito da ausência de liderança por trás das demonstrações pró-impeachment no Brasil

No sin una cabeza: deconstruyendo el mito de la ausencia de liderazgo detrás de las protestas pro- impeachment en Brasil

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Abstract: By taking the streets in various demonstrations since 2013, the Brazilian people answered the call of different internet based social movements. However, there was a denial, both on the part of the individuals, as on the part of the movements that there were leaderships behind the organization of the demonstrations, more specifically of the pro-impeachment demonstrations, creating what we call the myth of absence of leadership. This paper aims to deconstruct this myth and to point some of the leaders behind the pro-impeachment demonstrations that occurred in 2016 in Brazil. To reject or confirm this myth, a three-step methodology was applied: (1) we researched on the main authors dealing with leadership in internet based social movements; (2) we sought to cut out Brazilian works, focusing on the Labic research; (3) we conduct a survey on articles on the topic published in the newspapers *Folha de São Paulo*, *Estado de São Paulo* e *G1* (*O Globo*). The triple methodology revealed leaderships behind the pro-impeachment demonstrations.

Keywords: Actant. Internet Based Social Movement. Leadership.

Resumo: Ao irem às ruas em diversas manifestações desde 2013, os brasileiros atenderam ao chamado de movimentos sociais baseados na internet. Contudo, houve negação, tanto por parte dos sujeitos, quanto dos movimentos de que existissem lideranças por trás dos protestos, mais especificamente das manifestações pró-impeachment de 2016, criando-se o que chamamos de mito da ausência de liderança. Para rechaçar ou confirmar esse mito, foi aplicada uma metodologia em três etapas: (1) verificou-se os principais autores a tratarem de liderança em movimentos sociais baseados na internet; (2) buscou-se recortar trabalhos Brasileiros, recaindo nosso foco sobre pesquisas do Labic; (3) fez-se um levantamento de matérias publicadas sobre o tema nos jornais Folha de São Paulo, Estado de São Paulo e G1 (O Globo). A metodologia tríplice revelou lideranças por trás das manifestações pró-

impeachment no Brasil, o que refuta o mito da ausência de liderança.

Resumen: Al salir a las calles en varias manifestaciones desde 2013, los brasileños respondieron al llamado de los movimientos sociales basados en Internet. Sin embargo, hubo negación, tanto por los sujetos, como por los movimientos de que había líderes detrás de las protestas, más específicamente de las demostraciones pro-impeachment de 2016, creando lo que llamamos el mito de la ausencia de liderazgo. Para rechazar o confirmar este mito, se aplicó una metodología de tres pasos: (1) se encontró los principales autores que lidian con el liderazgo en los movimientos sociales basados en Internet; (2) buscamos recortar. obras brasileñas, enfocando la investigación de Labic; (3) hicimos una encuesta de materiales publicados acerca del tema en los periódicos Folha de São Paulo, Estado de São Paulo e G1 (O Globo). La metodología triple reveló liderazgo detrás de las manifestaciones pro-impeachment en Brasil, que refuta el mito de la ausencia de liderazgo.

1 Introduction

Since 2013 Brazil has been convulsed in many ways by street demonstrations. Once received in a very optimistic way by scholars and international analysts, these demonstrations seem to have been co-opted by mass media, financial groups and oligarchies and were orchestrated to be part of the political pressure that lead to the impeachment of the president Dilma Rousseff, member of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT* (Workers' Party), in August 31, 2016. Actually the events that culminated in the impeachment started with demonstrations in 2013 and with the re-election of Rousseff in 2014. About the runoff against her opponent, Aécio Neves of the *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB* (Brazilian Social Democracy Party), Kingstone and Power (2017) say:

> The runoff between Aécio and Dilma was the closest election in modern Brazilian history, with Dilma winning by only 3.28 percent. The closeness of this margin and the fact that Aécio demanded (and failed to obtain) a recount of the votes cast a polarizing shadow over the eventual impeachment process in 2015–2016.

Kingstone and Power (2017) call attention to the fact that this election confirmed new patterns of presidential voting in Brazil. After several years of pro-poor policies, the traditional middle class found reasons to vote against the PT, mainly because the middle class incomes grew at slower rates than the lower class incomes, but also at slower rates than the upper class (Ibidem). As soon as Rousseff took office, and as a symptom of the political storm to come, she had to deal with the most conservative congress since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985 (BOADLE, 2016) and with strong corruption allegations against the PT. Effectively the accusations of corruption are prior to the impeachment process itself. They start at 2013 with the June Journeys, a series of massive demonstrations that happened throughout Brazil in 2013:

> These demonstrations were mainly triggered by the increase of public transportation ticket prices in the city of São Paulo, although they have evolved in very diverse ways, encompassing a wide range of claims and grievances. Within a broader and international cycle of protests, thousands of Brazilians marched on the streets of dozens of cities and flooded online social networks with expressions of outrage and of demands for change. At its peak, on June 20, at least 1.4 million Brazilians demonstrated in more than 120 cities of the country (FLETCHER, 2017).

The June Journeys aims were quite diffuse, but certain indignation against corruption was recurrent (GOHN, 2016, p. 6). The simplistic reading made at that time took to an excessive optimism, to the point of calling them the "Brazilian Spring" in allusion to the Arab Spring. In 2014 there was a new wave of demonstrations, this time also questioning the investments that were made to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. In 2014 the demonstrations retract, probably because the focus was on the electoral race. The people's answer to the complains about corruption, politics and economic crisis, should appear at the polls. Well, at least it was expected.

Is not hard to understand the optimism. For the first time in years Brazilian people seemed to break a kind of political lethargy by going to the streets. Similarly to what happened in the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street and 15M, the internet was the main tool to call people to the streets and organize demonstrations. More than that, internet seemed to be a free territory, the most appropriate place to individuals discuss politics and organize themselves far from the old parties and traditional social and political leaderships. This idea, based mainly on enthusiasm and common sense, added some Utopian components to the June Journeys and its possible results.

The results and the impacts of the elections of 2016 still should be better analyzed. What we know so far is that, along with the re-election of Rousseff, instead of getting rid of the corrupt politicians, instead of voting

for candidates that could represent something new, the most conservative congress since the end of the military dictatorship was elected. Although they may contain complex layers, in practice, the demonstrations of 2013 and 2014 led to a very simplistic ideological polarization.

In parallel, between the June Journeys and the elections, the corporate media, has made an effort to retake the narrative about the country's political history, consolidating once again its hegemonic point of view not only over the demonstrations of 2013 but also over the electoral results. As a way to control the narrative, the corporate media reinforced the polarization by creating an antagonism "us" x "they", being "we" those against corruption, and by extension, against the PT. "Us" is treated as free minded and non-alienated group, that follows no party or leadership, that proudly says: "We do not have pet politicians"[2] while "they" are brainwashed and follow only their corrupt old leaders. Also, "us" in such narrative is always right and "they" are always wrong. *The Operação Lava-Jato*, an anti-corruption operation of the Federal Police, quickly became an important part of this narrative. Adding to it not only a vision of "moral" but also an idea of legitimacy.

Even without assuming formal leaderships or "pet politicians" some groups were able, not only to organize the demonstrations pro-impeachment, but also to root themselves to the "realpolitik", making associations with political and economic powers. In fact, almost two years after the impeachment, is possible to name the groups that acted as leaderships behind the impeachment, by disseminating information (mainly a lot of fake news and misinformation) and organizing the demonstrations. During this work we aim to briefly mention the most important organizations behind the pro-impeachment demonstrations and question the myth of absence of leadership, usually related to the internet based social movements.

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[2] Originally: "*nós não temos políticos de estimação*".

In this context, leadership means the ability to convince, gather and conduct an individual or a group of individuals. Leadership can also be defined as the responsibility to create interpersonal, structural and procedural conditions to enable others to achieve a shared purpose in the face of uncertainty (Ganz, 2000).

The idea of leaderless movements or "organization of the organizationless" (NUNES, 2014) is not exclusive of the Brazilian recent demonstrations. It also appears in the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street and other internet based social movements (movements that start and/or spread by using the digital networks). These movements are permeated by contradictions, one of them is the myth of absence of leadership.

2 Methodology

In order to reject or confirm the myth of absence of leadership, a three-step methodology was applied: (1) we researched on the main authors dealing with leadership in internet based social movements; (2) we sought to cut out Brazilian works, focusing on the Labic research; (3) we conduct a survey on articles on the topic published in the newspapers *Folha de São Paulo*, *Estado de São Paulo* e *G1* (*O Globo*). The triple methodology revealed leaderships behind the pro-impeachment demonstrations.

The first step was to research on the most cited authors that work on the web based digital movements and leadership. By using the Google Scholar tool we identified Gerbaudo (2012), Fuchs (2012), Bennett and Segerberg (2013) and Nunes (2014) as the most cited authors on the field. Then we analyzed the authors' texts, extracting their impressions regarding the possible absence of visible leaders on the web based digital movements. Once we did our characterization we realized that the denial of leadership was very strong among the internet based social movements, together with non-partisanship.

The Arab Spring, the Occupy Wall Street, the 15M, the June Journeys, and later the demonstrations against the World Cup in 2014 and pro-impeachment demonstrations in Brazil were self-proclaimed leaderless and non-partisan. Gerbaudo (2012), Fuchs (2012), Bennett and Segerberg (2013) and Nunes (2014) point that the denial of leadership and the non-partisanism are only idealizations. In fact all the listed movements had leaders, however, the leadership operates on the internet based movements differently from the modes related to traditional social movements, unions and parties. The leadership works mostly behind the scenes in a way that Gerbaudo (2012) calls "choreography of assembly".

The second step was to turn eyes to Brazilian reality. In order to understand the myth of absence of leadership in the Brazilian pro-impeachment demonstrations we use academic research, news and articles available online. Again we used the Google Scholar tool to identify Brazilian researches that juxtaposed web based social movements and leadership. Than we find the Labic (Laboratory of Image and Cyberculture Studies) research on actants and Facebook interactions, conducted by Malini. As a method, Malini (2016) applies the cartographic method (LATOUR, 2012) to understand how different actants relate on social networks. In order to do so graphs are created using the Gephi software. We took some of those graphs as a reference to the present research.

The third step was the collection of articles in the three biggest Brazilian newspapers (SACCHITIELLO, 2020): *Folha de São Paulo*, *Estado de São Paulo* e G1 (*O Globo*). We searched for articles published online that mentioned the demonstrations and its possible leaders. Indeed, we found few articles (listed in tables below) on the subject. It is inferred that the few mentions occurred because the newspapers avoided relating the demonstrations and the theme of leadership.

Nevertheless, by crossing data from Labic and the newspapers, we realized that the most relevant actants inside the networks were also mentioned on the articles. Whenever possible, we pointed how these

actants rooted in the recent political scenario in Brazil. This was done through the identification of the actants present in the networks in the narrative of the corporate media.

3 The myth of absence of leadership

During the bibliographical research made to define the main characteristics of the internet based social movements, the horizontality was recurrent in the literature. In a way there is no surprise on this finding, once horizontality is fundamental to the digital networks structuration itself. The interesting finding of our research was to notice, together with the horizontality, the total denial of formal leadership by the actants of the networks. Bennett and Segerberg (2013) realized that organizations such as unions are on decline since the establishment of the internet era. One explanation for this phenomenon could be that digital platforms ensure a space in which the individuals express themselves without intermediates.

Based on field research, Gerbaudo (2012) came to the conclusion that, although the movements claim that they are leaderless, there are in fact soft leaders. The leaders make use of social media for choreographing protests in what he calls "choreography of assembly". In his metaphor someone "choreographs" instead of being a traditional leader:

> The introduction of social media in social movements does not simply result in a situation of absolute spontaneity and unrestrained participation. On the contrary, influential Facebook admins and activist tweets become 'soft leaders' or choreographers, involved in setting the scene, and constructing an emotional space within which collective action can unfold (GERBAUDO, 2012).

Fuchs (2012) says that the reading of Ghonim's (2012) memoirs of the Egyptian revolution and Graeber's (2012 apud FUCHS, 2012)

reflections on the Occupy Wall Street movement confirms that "there were groups of activists that organized the spontaneity of the movements" (FUCHS, 2012). This conclusion reinforces the idea of "choreography of assembly".

Despite the denial of formal leaderships there are leaders, such as Ghonim and Graeber. These "soft leaders" as Gerbaudo (2012) says, were actants in their networks that became more prominent. They were creators or moderators of websites or social network profiles or individuals whose network activities gained visibility and capillarity inside a specific network. Network is considered here as group of actants sharing a platform or digital environment.

These actants eventually became influencers, nodal points or vice versa. So, under the horizontal surface, some nodal points pops and are able to concentrate and/or orientate the informational flow inside the network. That happens because they are more referenced and are considered more relevant by other actants.

They became important because their peers inside the network make them important. We use this assumption for this research, considering that the arising of nodal point is a natural process of the network. Nevertheless, we understand that web advertising investments, trolls, hoaxes, fake news, "like farms" and other digital phenomena can easily create artificial nodal points. This consideration, in fact, shows that not only the absence of leadership is a myth, but that the networks can be manipulated by some actants with more access to knowledge, money and infrastructure. Once there are nodal points, there are leaders or organizers (NUNES, 2014) even under an apparent decentralization. Certainly internet is a platform that possibility the horizontal organization and changes the way social movements are organized. Still, horizontalization is not total because every time an actant get stronger, it can possibly turn into nodal point in a network.

Anyway, is important to understand that the myth of absence of leadership is also a consequence of certain skepticism with the traditional social and political institutions. Once people went to the streets, not only in Brazil but also in Spain and in the USA to demonstrate against corruption, is very reasonable to conclude that the myth of absence of leadership is a way to keep away from politicians – which in occidental democracies appear as natural leaderships – and political parties. Following this logic, non-partisanship is other strong component of the internet based social movements. "We have no leaders and no political parties". A lot of people that went to the streets worldwide in the last few years believe that statement. In the Spanish 15M, for example:

> [...] the 15M is constituted by multiple groups, campaigns and forms of protest and involvement in continuous change. There was no partisan alignment and no leader organization within the movement although coalitions with formal organization were in progressive growth (LOPEZ, 2015).

Despite the criticism made by movements as the Occupy Wall Street and the 15M, political parties or groups emerged (LOPEZ, 2015) and took advantage from them (GOHN, 2016; TUFEKCI, 2017). In Brazil:

> When asked about their perception of some kind of leadership present during the manifestations in 2013, the activists rejected strongly the idea of the mass being maneuvered by political leaders. It appears clear that new forms of political dialogue were discussed within the uprisings: a dialogue that excludes the figure of the leader as "someone that represents me" and, eventually, accepts the presence of leaders for logistic, organizational reasons (PISCHETOLA, 2016).

As Bennett and Segerberg (2013) admit, to examine how power is distributed in networks is crucial. This involves the problem of leadership and the relationships of all the members participating of each network. Is

precisely because the network complexity that is so hard to determine the leaderships that emerge from them, as we shall see below.

4 The giant Duck

In several Brazilian capitals, above the green and yellow crowd that demonstrated against president Rousseff, inflatable giant ducks were floating. These ducks, financed by the *Federação das Indústrias de São Paulo, FIESP* (Federation of Industries of São Paulo), and its president Paulo Skaf, were symbol of an alleged high tax burden and were also a remind that the main reason for the impeachment was not the corruption accusations, but financial and political interests behind them.

The ducks, together with the "*Pixuleco*", an inflatable giant caricature of the former president Lula, were seen in several demonstrations and became representative of the pro-impeachment demonstrations. More than that, merchandising products and replicas of the "*Pixuleco*" were sold by an organization called *União dos Movimentos de Brasília, UMB* (Union of the Movements of Brasília). Is not clear which movements are these, and the UMB Facebook fanpage[3] is quite unrepresentative, with no more than 1.126 followers. In addition, even considering that Fiesp is a traditional leadership, the "soft" way it acted during the pro-impeachment demonstrations reinforces the idea of "choreography of assembly" (GERBAUDO, 2012), which in the case of the pro-impeachment demonstrations comically was not only a metaphor[4].

So the internet based social movements do have leaders but is hard to identify them, considering the network architecture and the denial of the idea of leadership by the network actants. In order to defend this

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[3] Retrieved from: https://www.facebook.com/Uniao.Mov.Bsb/.
[4] In a demonstration that took place on August 11, 2015, in the city of Fortaleza a group of uniformed demonstrators performed a pro-impeachment choreography. The choreography, that became known nationally as the "*dancinha do impeachment*" (impeachment dance) was filmed and posted online by the local newspaper *O Povo* (NOVAES, 2015).

affirmation, we articulate two different methods. First, we present two maps elaborated by Malini, researcher of the Labic, of networks composed by Facebook interactions. The network interaction flow shows the main actants and the nodal points of the network. By inference, we assume that the nodal points are potential leaders. Then we use data from the corporate media that mention those nodal points (people and groups) as leaderships or organizers of the pro-impeachment demonstrations. By following these steps, we hope to highlight the existence of leaderships in the pro-impeachment demonstrations.

**Graph 1** – "who likes who"

Source: Malini (2016).

Malini's graph shows that, despite that the left-wing Facebook pages and profiles concentrate more interactions they are not able to produce a cohesive narrative about impeachment. Those pages and profiles identified in red and blue (according to their role in the June Journeys) represent the largest part of Graph 1. But if we look carefully, more nodal points appear in the yellow part, which Malini (2016) associates with what

he calls the "*Nova Direita*" (New Right). If we discard individuals and focus only on groups, clockwise the most significant (bigger) nodal points are: *Movimento Brasil Livre, MBL* (Free Brazil Movement); *Vem para a Rua* (Come to the Street), *Revoltados On-Line* (Revolted On-line); *TV Revolta* (Revolt TV), *Folha Política* (Political "News") and *Movimento Contra a Corrupção* (Movement Against Corruption).

Malini (2016) goes further and elaborates a second graph focusing on "who republished who" in order to indicate how a determinate group, used other groups or profiles with the same or similar political orientation to reinforces its narrative. The author came to the conclusion that the right-winged groups were much more effective to reinforce their narratives by using each others profiles and Facebook pages.

Graph 2 –"Pages shared by 3449 Facebook channels mobilized against or in favor the impeachment"

Source: Malini (2016).

The graph 2 evidence the most important pro-impeachment actants. Not only because they are important by themselves, but, because once they are "republished" by their peers they acquire more relevance inside the network becoming stronger nodal points. According to the graph, they

are: *Movimento Contra a corrupção*, *Vem pra Rua Brasil*, *Movimento Brasil Livre*. Now let's turn to the samples collected in the corporate media to know what they say about these groups.

Throughout 2016 the *G1* (*O Globo*), part of the largest media conglomerate in Brazil, does not dedicate much attention to explain who were the groups behind the pro-impeachment demonstrations. Nevertheless, in the collected sample, they even listed more groups than is shown by Malini's cartography. The *Estado de São Paulo* followed the same policy, however, in opposition to the *G1* (*O Globo)*, it only mentioned three groups. The *Folha de São Paulo* not only mentions the four groups, but dedicates an article to talk deeply about them. The results of this data collection may be seen below:

Table 1 –Movements mentioned by each corporate media group

Journal	Date	Group					
		Movimento Brasil Livre	Vem Pra Rua	Revoltados On Line	Solidariedade[5]	Endireita Brasil	"outro ligado ao ator Alexandre Frota"[6]
Folha de São Paulo[7]	15/03/2015	x	x	x	x		
G1[8]	13/12/2015	x	x	x	x	x	x

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[5] The most interesting thing is that the Solidariedade (Solidarity) is actually a political party. It is not spontaneously referenced inside the digital networks, but it very opportunistically shows up on the streets. Further research can point that other parties and politicians also showed up since the beginning of the pro-impeachment demonstrations, proving that the non-partisanship and non-leadership were only part of a well told narrative.

[6] The translation would be something like: "another movement related to the actor Alexandre Frota". The former *Globo* actor and former porn star became a prominent pro-impeachment activist.

[7] Available in: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/03/1603286-protestos-contra-o-governo-reune-quase-1-milhao-pelo-pais.shtml.

[8] Retrieved from:
http://g1.globo.com/sao-paulo/noticia/2015/12/manifestantes-se-reunem-na-avenida-paulista-em-ato-contra-governo-dilma.html.

Estado de São[9] Paulo[10]	24/02/2017	x		x	x		

Source: The author.

Among the movements listed above three coincide with Malini's graphs: *Vem para a Rua*, *Revoltados On-line* e *Movimento Brasil Livre*. So, according to our research, which is very incipient considering the method used, there were leaderships behind the pro-impeachment demonstrations. This not only it can be seen on the data collected from the graphs, but also, the corporate media perceives and nominates the groups that operates as leaderships. This finding may corroborate with Gerbaudo's notion of soft leadership. However, on this point, we can not totally agree or disagree with Gerbaudo, further research is necessary. The only thing we can definitely say is that the absence of leadership on the internet based social movements is certainly a myth.

5 Final considerations: who "pays the duck"?

The expression in Brazilian Portuguese "who is going to pay the duck?" (*quem vai pagar o pato?*)[11] became one of the symbols of the pro-impeachment demonstrations, once that the *Fiesp* and Paulo Skaf financed the inflatable giant ducks. In this case specifically is quite clear who paid the ducks, there is no metaphor. Is also clear who paid for the "*Pixuleco*"

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[9] Retrieved from: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:qYj1uzhbgMMJ:politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,briga-online-expoe-racha-da-nova-direita,70001677831+&cd=3&hl=pt-BR&ct=clnk&gl=br.

[10] There is here a chronological distortion, as can be noticed. This is due to the newspaper's policy of blocking non-subscribers. Nevertheless, we were able to find a text that mentions the main groups that organized the pro-impeachment demonstrations.

[11] In English an expression with a similar meaning would be "to carry the can".

inflatable giant dolls. But how about the other "ducks" and "dolls"? How about the other costs of the demonstrations? Who "paid" them?

About the *Movimento Brasil Livre*, is said that the group receives money from the Koch industries trough its political and social institutes. The interest behind it would be to exploit the Brazilian petrol reservations known as pre-salt. The *Revoltados On-line* says to be financed by the merchandising of products. The *Vem pra Rua*, according to Renan Santos of the *MBL*, is composed by wealthy older men and receives money from the PSDB. Information about the three movements and even about other actants of the pro-impeachment demonstrations can be abundantly found on different online sources[12]. But let's start from the assumption that these sources are not reliable. What the recent political history of Brazil has to say about these groups?

The *MBL* used the group visibility to elect seven councilmen and a mayor1 in the municipal elections that took place in Brazil in 2016. Also, MBL members have been nominated for public office throughout the

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12 Retrieved from: http://www.debateprogressista.com.br/pioneira-na-luta-pelo-impeachment-afirma-que-vem-pra-rua-e-mbl-sao-financiados-pelo-psdb-e-nao-sao-espontaneos/.
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country[13]. The *Vem Pra Rua* has had a more discreet performance, however Rogério Chequer, one of its founders, left the movement to launch candidacy to the state government of São Paulo by the *Partido Novo* (New Party). The *Revoltados On-line* was aligned with the extreme right presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro, that once flirted with *MBL*, but now the group lost its reach because its page was removed from Facebook[14].

Is necessary to say that to the aims of this article, our approach was exclusively qualitative and merely exploratory. The graphs and tables that we presented throughout this work give a small view of multiple actants, its intricate relations and multiple interactions. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of the data collected by the Labic and of our sample took from the of corporate media shows that our hypothesis, based on Gerbaudo's and Fuchs' conclusions was well orientated and is perfectly applicable to the Brazilian case.

It is possible to affirm, based on our research, that the absence of leadership is certainly a myth perpetrated by the internet based social movements. Nevertheless, further research is necessary to understand how this myth appears and is sustained. This is actually part of a narrative build about these movements, which does not apply to the real dynamics of them. Is also necessary to understand the impact of the myth of the absence of leadership to the contemporary democracies. Gerbaudo (2012) shows that in the Spanish case the some soft leaders that appeared during the 13M later articulated themselves around political movements and parties, even new parties, such as the *Partido X*, despite the partisanship denial. In Brazil, also despite the partisanship denial, quite quickly the pro-impeachment groups showed partisan tendencies.

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13 Retrieved from: https://www.pragmatismopolitico.com.br/2017/07/integrantes-do-mbl-ocupam-cargos-publicos-pelo-brasil.html.
14 Retrieved from: https://catracalivre.com.br/geral/cidadania/indicacao/pagina-revoltados-on-line-e-retirada-do-ar-pelo-facebook/.

Although we are only speculating, is very serious to think that the Brazilian political game was definitely influenced by figures such as Skaf, representative of industrialists and supporter of the labor reform, and Koch, interested in the privatization of the pre-salt[15]. Actually, the labor reform was approved in 2017, same year of the first pre-salt privatization auction. If the issue of funding is true, some groups that organized the pro-impeachment demonstrations seem to be puppets on the hands of much bigger interests. Nevertheless, this article doesn't intents to shed light on this, but on democracy itself. We warn that democracies must be rethought considering the impacts of the internet based social movements. In fact, these movements used to be considered as something always positive, but they can also hide ominous interests, even putting people and political systems on risk.

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[15] To more information (in Portuguese) see:
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